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The study investigated the power of theoretically derived cognitive variables to predict posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), travel phobia, and depression following injury in a motor vehicle accident
(MVA). MVA survivors (N  147) were assessed at the emergency department on the day of their
accident and 2 weeks, 1 month, 3 months, and 6 months later. Diagnoses were established with the
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM–IV. Predictors included initial symptom severities; variables
established as predictors of PTSD in E. J. Ozer, S. R. Best, T. L. Lipsey, and D. S. Weiss’s (2003)
meta-analysis; and variables derived from cognitive models of PTSD, phobia, and depression. Results of
nonparametric multiple regression analyses showed that the cognitive variables predicted subsequent
PTSD and depression severities over and above what could be predicted from initial symptom levels.
They also showed greater predictive power than the established predictors, although the latter showed
similar effect sizes as in the meta-analysis. In addition, the predictors derived from cognitive models of
PTSD and depression were disorder-specific. The results support the role of cognitive factors in the
maintenance of emotional disorders following trauma.
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Traumatic experiences are common in the general population,
but only a minority of survivors develop chronic emotional prob-
lems, such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; e.g., Kessler,
Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson, 1995). For those individuals
who develop PTSD, the condition can be highly persistent and
disabling (Norris, 1992). Several authors have emphasized the
need to identify factors that predict who will develop PTSD
following traumatic events, and initial studies have identified some
candidate variables (for reviews, see Blanchard & Hickling, 2004;
Brewin, Andrews, & Valentine, 2000). A recent meta-analysis
identified the following variables as the best established predictors
of PTSD: prior trauma, prior psychological adjustment, family
history of psychopathology, perceived life threat during the
trauma, posttrauma social support, peritraumatic emotional re-
sponse, and peritraumatic dissociation (Ozer, Best, Lipsey, &
Weiss, 2003). The present study aimed to extend this research by
(a) considering other trauma-related emotional disorders in addi-
tion to PTSD and (b) examining the predictive power of theory-
derived cognitive variables.
The Prediction of Emotional Disorders Following Trauma
Past research on predictors of psychological problems following
trauma has mainly focused on PTSD. There is, however, evidence
that other emotional disorders are also common after traumatic
experiences, including depression, other anxiety disorders, and
substance use disorders (e.g., Blanchard et al., 2004; Mayou,
Bryant, & Ehlers, 2001; O’Donnell, Creamer, Pattison, & Atkin,
2004). To date, studies have mainly investigated these other dis-
orders as comorbid diagnoses of PTSD and found that comorbidity
may be the norm rather than an exception (for a review, see Brady,
Killeen, Brewerton, & Lucerini, 2000). However, there is also
evidence that some survivors develop only a mood, substance use,
or other anxiety disorder after trauma but not PTSD (Mayou et al.,
2001; O’Donnell, Creamer, Pattison, & Atkin, 2004). Few studies
to date have investigated risk factors for these disorders following
trauma or tested what factors predict which of the different psy-
chological problems trauma survivors will develop. The results of
the existing studies have been inconsistent (Mayou et al., 2001;
McFarlane, Atchison, & Yehuda, 1997; O’Donnell, Creamer, &
Pattison, 2004; Shalev et al., 1998).
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development and maintenance of different emotional problems
following trauma, cognitive theories of emotional disorders may
offer a useful starting point. These theories postulate content
specificity (e.g., Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Clark,
1999)—that is, each emotional disorder is thought to be charac-
terized by different cognitive themes and biases. Cognitive models
might therefore possess a greater potential to differentially predict
psychological disorders than other models suggested in the liter-
ature that do not assume such specificity. In line with this idea, a
cross-sectional study of motor vehicle accident (MVA) survivors
found preliminary evidence that theory-derived cognitive predic-
tors differentially predict PTSD, travel phobias, and depression
(Ehring, Ehlers, & Glucksman, 2006). The cognitive variables
derived from each disorder-specific model explained significantly
greater proportions of the variance of the respective symptom
severities than cognitive variables derived from the models of the
other disorders. However, the interpretation of the findings is
limited by the cross-sectional nature of the study, which only
allowed a prediction in a statistical sense. The present prospective
longitudinal study aimed to test whether theory-derived cognitive
variables allow a temporal prediction of subsequent PTSD, travel
phobia, and depression following trauma.
Cognitive–Behavioral Models of PTSD, Phobias, and
Depression
Several disorder-specific cognitive models have been developed
to explain the disorders under investigation (for reviews, see Clark,
1999; Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 1998; Salkovskis, 1996). In the
following, we summarize the models on which the present study
was based.
Cognitive predictors for PTSD were derived from Ehlers and
Clark’s (2000) model. The authors postulated that people with
PTSD perceive a current threat, which has two sources: (a) the
nature of the trauma memory, and (b) problematic appraisals of the
trauma and/or its aftermath. The memory for the traumatic event is
thought to be poorly elaborated and poorly integrated into the
autobiographical memory base. Together with other trauma mem-
ory characteristics (strong perceptual priming and strong condi-
tioned associations), the poor elaboration is thought to lead to an
insufficient inhibition and easy triggering of involuntary memories
that lack awareness of the self in the past and other relevant
context information. The nature of the trauma memory is thought
to be the result of problematic cognitive processing during the
trauma, especially a predominance of data-driven processing (i.e.,
predominant processing of the sensory impressions, as opposed to
processing of the meaning of the situation) and a lack of self-
referential processing (i.e., insufficient linking of the event to
knowledge of the self), both of which overlap, in part, with
dissociation (Halligan, Michael, Clark, & Ehlers, 2003). PTSD is
thought to be maintained by a range of cognitive and behavioral
strategies that the individual uses to control the current threat.
These include thought suppression, rumination, avoidance, and
safety behaviors (i.e., excessive precautions). Several cross-
sectional and prospective longitudinal studies following different
types of traumatic events found significant relationships between
the cognitive factors specified by Ehlers and Clark (2000) and
PTSD (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; Dunmore, Clark, & Ehlers, 1999,
2001; Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998; Halligan et al., 2003;
Laposa & Alden, 2003; Murray, Ehlers, & Mayou, 2002). There is
also initial evidence that the theory-derived cognitive variables
significantly improve the prediction of PTSD symptom severity
over and above initial symptom severity and risk factors identified
in earlier research (Dunmore et al., 2001; Ehlers et al., 1998;
Ehring et al., 2006; Halligan et al., 2003).
Predictors for travel phobia were derived from a generic
cognitive–behavioral conceptualization of specific phobias, which
stresses the importance of threat-related appraisals concerning the
feared stimulus. These are thought to be maintained by avoidance
and safety behaviors that the individual uses to prevent or mini-
mize the predicted feared outcome (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg,
1985; Clark, 1999; Salkovskis, 1996). In the case of travel phobia,
for example, people may give up traveling or may only travel when
using safety behaviors, such as looking in the mirror frequently or
driving excessively slowly. In line with this view, earlier studies
have found that individuals with travel phobia endorse negative
beliefs about the dangerousness of travel and the anxiety/panic
symptoms that they may experience in travel situations and that
they employ safety behaviors (Ehlers, Hofmann, Herda, & Roth,
1994; Ehlers et al., 2007; Ehring et al., 2006; J. E. Taylor, Deane,
& Podd, 2000). According to conditioning accounts of phobias,
high fear during the accident is thought to lead to strong condi-
tioned fear responses and therefore expected to predict travel
phobias (S. Taylor & Koch, 1995). Ehring et al. (2006) and Mayou
et al. (2001) found that fear during the accident indeed predicted
travel phobia. With the exception of Mayou et al. (2001), prospec-
tive longitudinal studies of travel phobia after MVA are largely
lacking.
Predictors of major depression were derived from cognitive
conceptualizations of the disorder (for a review, see Ingram et al.,
1998). At the core of these models lies the hypothesis that depres-
sion is caused by the interaction of cognitive vulnerability factors
and matching stressors. According to this view, depressogenic
cognitive patterns are activated when vulnerable individuals en-
counter stressful situations and/or experience a decline in mood.
Typical examples of these cognitive patterns are a tendency to
develop negative and self-devaluative thoughts (Ingram et al.,
1998), depressive rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow,
1991), and the activation of depressogenic schematic models,
which result in a feeling tone of sad mood that reflects self-
devaluative thinking (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). Very few stud-
ies to date have tested cognitive conceptualizations of major de-
pression following trauma, possibly because in treatment studies
trauma survivors rarely present with depression alone. However,
prospective studies have shown that some survivors develop
trauma-related depression without PTSD (Mayou et al., 2001;
O’Donnell, Creamer, Pattison, & Atkin, 2004). Ehring et al.’s
(2006) cross-sectional study found preliminary evidence for the
role of self-devaluative thoughts and rumination in trauma-related
depression, and Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1991) found that
depressive rumination prior to a natural disaster predicted subse-
quent depression.
Aims and Hypotheses
The aim of the study was to investigate the power of disorder-
specific cognitive models in predicting PTSD, travel phobias, and
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sign. Predictor variables were assessed on the day of the accident
and 2 weeks after the MVA. Outcome measures were assessed at
2 weeks, 1 month, 3 months, and 6 months following the event. It
was expected that (a) variables derived from specific cognitive–
behavioral models would be more powerful in predicting the
severity of PTSD, phobias, and depression than established pre-
dictors of posttraumatic stress symptoms identified in the recent
meta-analysis by Ozer et al. (2003); (b) the different sets of
cognitive predictors would be disorder-specific in that the symp-
tom severity of each disorder would be best accounted for by its
specific model; and (c) the cognitive predictors would improve the
prediction of long-term outcome above what could be predicted
from initial symptom levels.
Method
Participants
Sample description. The sample comprised 147 injured MVA
survivors. Participants were recruited over a period of 19 months
from the emergency department of a large urban teaching hospital.
Inclusion criteria were as follows: injury in an MVA as a driver,
passenger, motorcyclist, or cyclist; injuries more severe than triage
category “blue” (very mild injuries); age between 18 and 65 years;
and address in local catchment area. Exclusion criteria were as
follows: left before receiving medical treatment; attended the
emergency department more than 12 hr after the accident; cur-
rently psychotic or suicidal; command of English was insufficient
to complete interviews. Table 1 shows demographic and accident
characteristics. The study sample did not significantly differ from
a random sample of MVA admissions at the same hospital (N 
223) in terms of sex (67% vs. 61% male), 
2(1, N  368), p  .32;
ethnic background (69% vs. 61% Caucasian), 
2(1, N  370), p 
.22; or injury severity scores (M  2.12, SD  2.34, vs. M  1.88,
SD  2.27), t(288)  0.89, p  .38. There was a marginally
significant difference for age, t(328.63)  1.97, p  .05; par-
ticipants were, on average, 2 years older than the random sample
of MVA survivors (M  35.17, SD  9.40, vs. M  33.11, SD 
10.37).
Recruitment. First contact with participants was established in
two ways: First, a researcher approached 115 MVA survivors at
the emergency department within hours after their MVA. Of the 74
survivors who were initially interested, 21 did not proceed, and 53
(72%) participated. Second, MVA survivors who attended the
emergency department outside the hours when recruitment staff
were present received an invitation letter and an information sheet
in the mail between 1 and 5 days following their accident. Two
days later, a researcher contacted these individuals via the tele-
phone to establish whether they were interested and eligible to take
part in the study. Of the 269 individuals who were contacted, 20
were excluded as they did not meet inclusion criteria, and 123
declined. Of the 130 MVA survivors who were initially interested
in the study, 36 did not proceed, and 94 (72%) participated. The
two recruitment methods yielded identical results (e.g., yielded
similar patterns of correlations with the outcome measures), and
the results are therefore presented for the full sample of 147
participants. Data from the follow-up assessment at 6 months were
available for 141 (96%) participants.
Outcome Measures
Diagnostic interviews. The presence of PTSD, travel phobia,
and major depressive disorder was assessed with the Structured
Clinical Interview for DSM–IV (SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, &
Williams, 1996). At the 2-week assessment, the presence of PTSD
Symptom Criteria A to D and F was assessed, as the Duration
Criterion E was not fulfilled yet. For a diagnosis of travel phobia,
participants had to meet Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (4th ed.; DSM–IV; American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation, 1994) criteria for a specific phobia, with the phobic situ-
ation being one or more travel situations (i.e., driving a car, being
a passenger in a car or on a bus, riding a motorbike or a bicycle).
However, Criterion G (symptoms are not better accounted for by
PTSD) was not used for the present analyses. The DSM–IV is
inconsistent in that it allows comorbid diagnoses of PTSD and
depression but not of PTSD and travel phobia. Determining
whether participants met criteria for travel phobia, regardless of
whether they also had PTSD, made it possible to (a) relate the
degree of phobic symptoms to the predictor variables and (b)
examine the overlap between symptoms of PTSD and travel pho-
bia in our sample, especially the percentage of participants with
PTSD who also met full criteria for travel phobia when the
hierarchy rule was not applied. Interrater reliability for the SCID
interviews was high (PTSD: .82; specific phobia: .85;
major depression: 1; n  56 randomly chosen interviews from
Table 1
Demographic and Accident Characteristics
Variable n (%) M (SD)
Demographics
Sex
Male 98 (66.7)
Female 49 (33.3)
Age (years) 35.17 (9.40)
Ethnic group
Caucasian 101 (68.7)
Black 33 (22.4)
Other 13 (8.8)
Marital status
a
Single 88 (60.3)
Married 40 (12.3)
Divorced/separated 18 (27.4)
Education (years) 14.85 (3.96)
Employment status
b
Working 116 (80.0)
Student 20 (13.8)
Not working 9 (6.2)
Accident characteristics
Type of road user
Driver 44 (29.9)
Passenger 23 (15.6)
Motorcyclist 56 (38.1)
Bicyclist 24 (16.3)
ISS score 2.12 (2.34)
Note. ISS  Injury Severity Score (Baker, O’Neill, Haddon, & Long,
1974).
a n  146.
b n  145.
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kappas above .70 indicate good reliability (First et al., 1996).
Self-report scales. Each of the psychological outcomes was
assessed with standardized self-report measures: the Posttraumatic
Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa, Cashman, Jaycox, & Perry, 1997;
.93–.95), a validated and widely used self-report measure of
PTSD symptom severity; the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI;
Beck et al., 1979; .90–.95), a standardized questionnaire of
established reliability and validity to assess the severity of depres-
sive symptoms; and the Travel Phobia Questionnaire (TPQ; Ehring
et al., 2006; .94–.96), a measure of the severity of travel
phobia. The TPQ closely follows DSM–IV criteria for specific
phobia and comprises 12 items about the participant’s fear in travel
situations, items related to the DSM–IV criteria of insight and
interference, and the degree of avoidance related to travel. Ehring
et al. (2006) reported that the TPQ showed good internal consis-
tency, retest reliability, agreement with SCID assessments of pho-
bia, and predictive validity.
Established Predictors From Ozer et al.’s (2003) Meta-
Analysis
Table 2 gives an overview of the predictor variables. Self-report
questionnaires and semistructured interviews assessed six predic-
tors identified in Ozer et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis. For practical
reasons, one of the predictors from the meta-analysis, namely
family history of psychopathology, could not be assessed in this
study. This variable showed the lowest effect size in the meta-
analysis and generally has not been found to predict PTSD fol-
lowing MVA (Blanchard & Hickling, 2004).
Number of past traumas. The Trauma History Interview de-
termined the number of traumatic events fulfilling the DSM–IV
stressor criteria that participants had experienced before the MVA.
It was based on similar trauma checklists (Blake et al., 1995; Foa
et al., 1997).
Past emotional problems. The SCID assessed whether partic-
ipants had a history of past major depression, PTSD, or travel
phobia. In addition, participants reported whether they had had any
past treatment for emotional problems or substance abuse.
Perceived life threat during the accident. Participants rated,
on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very strongly), how much they
had believed they were going to die during the accident.
Negative emotions during the MVA. The Peritraumatic Emo-
tions Questionnaire (Evans, Ehlers, Mezey, & Clark, 2007; Halli-
gan et al., 2003; .89) asks participants to rate the extent to
which they experienced each of 15 negative emotions during the
accident and until help arrived. This questionnaire has been shown
to have good internal consistency and to predict PTSD symptoms
after assault (Evans et al., 2007; Halligan et al., 2003).
Dissociation during the MVA. The State Dissociation Ques-
tionnaire (SDQ; Murray et al., 2002; .90) is a nine-item scale
assessing different aspects of dissociation, such as derealization,
depersonalization, detachment, altered time sense, emotional
numbing, and reduction of awareness in surroundings. The SDQ
has shown good reliability and validity in traumatized and non-
traumatized samples (e.g., Ehring et al., 2006; Halligan et al.,
2003; Murray et al., 2002). It correlates strongly with the Peritrau-
matic Dissociation Scale (Marmar, Weiss, & Metzler, 1997).
Social support after the MVA. The Crisis Support Scale (Jo-
seph, 1999; seven items; .76) is a widely used measure of
social support in PTSD research. One item about personal contact
with other trauma survivors was omitted from the scale, as it did
not appear applicable to all MVA survivors. Instead, two items
about informational support (“Did people give you advice and
helpful information?”) and companionship support (“Did people
invite you to participate in social or leisure activities?”) were
included.
Cognitive Predictors of PTSD
Seven variables derived from Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cogni-
tive model of PTSD were assessed.
Cognitive processing during the MVA. The Cognitive Process-
ing Questionnaire (Halligan, Clark, & Ehlers, 2002; Halligan et al.,
2003) measures three aspects of cognitive processing during the
trauma, namely data-driven processing (eight items; e.g., “My
mind was fully occupied with what I felt, saw, heard and
smelled”), lack of self-referential processing (eight items; e.g., “I
felt as if the accident was happening to someone else”), and
dissociation (nine items; see the description of the SDQ above).
The questionnaire was developed in a series of studies (Halligan et
al., 2002, 2003; Murray et al., 2002) and showed good reliability
and validity in predicting intrusive memories and PTSD. The sum
score of all 25 items was used in this study (.95).
Table 2
Sets of Predictor Variables
Established predictors
a PTSD model Phobia model Depression model
No. past traumas
Past emotional problems
Perceived life threat
Negative emotions during
MVA
Dissociation during MVA
Social support
Cognitive processing during MVA
Memory disorganization
Negative appraisals of trauma and
sequelae
Safety behaviors (total scale)
Rumination about trauma and
consequences
Thought suppression
Ongoing dissociation
Fear during MVA
Concerns about future MVA
Beliefs about other drivers
Negative beliefs about travel
Safety behaviors (travel)
Vulnerability factors:
Self-devaluation
Negative self-evaluation
Depressive rumination
Stressor variables:
Social support
Ongoing physical problems
Stressful life events
Note. PTSD  posttraumatic stress disorder; MVA  motor vehicle accident.
a From Ozer et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis.
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(Halligan et al., 2003) asks participants to describe the quality of
their trauma memories. The Disorganization subscale consists of
five items that assess deficits in intentional recall (e.g., “I cannot
get what happened during the accident straight in my mind”). The
measure demonstrated good reliability and validity in earlier stud-
ies (Evans et al., 2007; Halligan et al., 2002, 2003). The internal
consistency in this study was .91.
Negative appraisals of the trauma and its sequelae. These
were assessed with the Negative Thoughts About the Self subscale
of the Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory (Foa, Ehlers, Clark,
Tolin, & Orsillo, 1999; 21 items; .94). The scale has been
shown to have good reliability and convergent validity and to
discriminate between traumatized people with and without PTSD
(Foa et al., 1999). It includes items that measure negative inter-
pretations of the initial PTSD symptoms (Dunmore et al., 2001;
Ehlers et al., 1998; Ehlers & Steil, 1995).
Safety behaviors (i.e., excessive precautions). The Safety Be-
haviors Questionnaire assesses excessive precautions related to
travel (14 items; e.g., “I keep checking the position of other
traffic”; .94) as well as generalized safety behaviors (10 items;
e.g., “I check carefully whether doors/windows are locked”; 
.86). The total score is the sum of all 24 items (.94). It was
developed over a series of studies (Dunmore et al., 1999, 2001;
Ehring et al., 2006) and has shown good internal consistencies and
correlations with PTSD severity.
Rumination and thought suppression. The Responses to Intru-
sions Questionnaire assesses aspects of trauma survivors’ re-
sponses to intrusive memories, namely rumination about the
trauma and/or its consequences (eight items; e.g., “I think about
why the event happened to me”; .86), and thought suppression
(six items; e.g., “I try to push them out of my mind:; .92). It
was developed in a series of studies (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999;
Ehlers et al., 1998; Halligan et al., 2003; Murray et al., 2002) and
has shown good reliability and predictive validity.
Ongoing dissociation. Dissociation at the time of assessment
was assessed with the Current Dissociation subscale of the SDQ
(Murray et al., 2002). Participants were asked to rate the items
regarding how they had felt during the preceding week (.94).
Cognitive Predictors of Travel Phobia
Five potential predictors of travel phobia following MVA were
assessed.
Fear during the accident. Fear was assessed with five items of
the Peritraumatic Emotions Questionnaire (Halligan et al., 2003)
described above (terrified, alarmed, frozen, fearful, and shocked;
.84).
Negative beliefs related to travel. Concerns about future acci-
dents (four items; e.g., “I will be injured in an accident”; .75)
and negative beliefs about travel (nine items; e.g., “Now I have had
one accident, I am more likely to have another one” and “If I am
anxious in traffic, this shows that I must be in danger”; .75)
were assessed with the Travel Phobia Beliefs Questionnaire
(Ehring et al., 2006). Negative beliefs about other drivers were
assessed with an adapted version of the Other Drivers subscale of
the Motor Vehicle Accident Scale (Fedoroff, Taylor, Asmundson,
& Koch, 2000; nine items; .82).
Safety behaviors while traveling. These were assessed with the
Travel subscale of the Safety Behaviors Questionnaire described
above.
Cognitive Predictors of Depression
Six variables representing the cognitive vulnerability–stress
model of depression were assessed.
Self-devaluation. The Depressed States Checklist (Teasdale &
Cox, 2001) asked participants to describe how they had felt when
their mood started to deteriorate during the preceding month by
rating 28 adjectives on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely).
The scale is based on Teasdale and Barnard’s (1993) interactive
cognitive subsystems theory. Relevant to this study was the sum of
the 14 adjectives that imply self-devaluation (e.g., unacceptable,
rejected, unwanted, worthless; .95). A second measure of
self-devaluation was the Negative Self-Evaluation subscale of the
Leiden Inventory of Depression Sensitivity (Van der Does, 2002;
eight items; e.g., “When in a sad mood, I think that fewer people
value me”; .87). This measure assesses cognitive reactivity to
sad mood.
Depressive rumination. The 10-item short version of the Re-
sponse Style Questionnaire (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991;
.89), a well-validated measure of depressive rumination, was
used.
Social support. This was measured with the Crisis Support
Scale described above.
Severity of ongoing physical problem. Participants rated the
extent to which they still suffered from ongoing physical problems
from the MVA on a scale from 0 (not at all severe) to 10 (very
severe).
Stressful life events. The Stressful Life Events Interview was
developed for this project on the basis of similar instruments (see
Wethington, Brown, & Kessler, 1997) to assess stressful life
events that participants had experienced within the past year. It
probes for the domains of family, friends, social life, work, health,
legal problems, finances, accommodation, and other events, and it
asks participants to name relevant events within each domain and
rate the distress caused by each event on a scale from 0 (not at all
distressing) to 100 (very distressing). The total number of stressful
life events with a minimum distress rating of 50 was used for the
analysis.
Additional measures. Demographics and characteristics of the
accident were assessed via a self-report questionnaire. A trained
nurse specializing in emergency medicine coded the severity of the
participant’s injuries using the Injury Severity Score (Baker,
O’Neill, Haddon, & Long, 1974).
Procedure
The study was approved by the local research ethics committees,
and participants gave written informed consent. Participants re-
ceived £50 as reimbursement for their time and travel expenses.
They were recruited and first tested at the emergency department
on the day of their accident or recruited via telephone within the
1st week following their MVA. Participants attended a 2-hr session
2 weeks after the accident (M  14 days, SD  4.2). The session
took place at the research department (n  95), at the participant’s
home (n  35), in the hospital ward (for 6 participants who were
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(n  11). The session included the completion of questionnaires
assessing predictor variables and symptom severities (PDS, BDI,
TPQ) as well as the SCID. In addition, experimental tasks were
carried out that will be reported elsewhere. Participants were then
sent follow-up questionnaires assessing outcome variables (PDS,
BDI, TPQ) at 1 month, 3 months, and 6 months following the
accident. In addition, the 6-month follow-up involved a telephone
interview with the same interviewer who had conducted the re-
search session at 2 weeks, including the SCID and the Stressful
Life Events Interview.
Data Analyses
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients (Spearman’s rho)
tested the associations between the continuous predictor variables
and symptom severity measures, because many variables were
skewed. Rank biserial correlation coefficients were computed for
dichotomous predictor variables (Willson, 1976).
Preanalysis screening tests showed that parametric regressions
were inappropriate, as the assumptions regarding the normality of
residuals and homoscedasticity were violated and could not be
corrected by transformations of the variables. Therefore, nonpara-
metric regression analyses were conducted via a generalized linear
models analysis with cases bootstrapping, as implemented in Stata
Version 8.1 (StataCorp, 2003). Bootstrapping is an approach for
estimating standard errors in regression analyses that does not
make any distributional assumptions (Chernick, 1999). This in-
volves repeatedly resampling the sample with replacement to
approximate what would happen if the population were sampled.
The number of bootstrap samples drawn for each analysis was set
to 1,999. We decided to use a data analytic approach that allowed
us to simultaneously include information on the dependent vari-
ables from all time points (overall analyses) while controlling for
the clustered data structure (i.e., the fact that several observations
of the same individual were included). Symptom severity scores
from all time points were considered simultaneously as the depen-
dent variable in this analysis, whereby the correlation structure
was maintained by resampling within subject clusters—the
cluster(subject) option as implemented in Stata. It has been sug-
gested that this approach is superior to analyzing only the last
assessment point (endpoint analyses) or conducting a time-by-time
analysis for each assessment point separately, as both options
result in loss of information (Everitt, 1998).
The predictive powers of the different sets of predictor variables
were compared with the Bayesian information criterion (BIC)
derived for each regression model. BIC is an index of the goodness
of fit of the prediction model, with low scores (which can be
negative) indicating a better fit. As differences between BICs
cannot be statistically tested, differences in the magnitude of BICs
were interpreted. As previous studies mainly used endpoint anal-
yses, we also conducted parallel analyses predicting symptom
severity measures at the 6-month follow-up only. These gave the
same results as the more comprehensive overall analyses (details
of these results are published as online supplemental material).
Calculating statistical power for regression models with clus-
tered data structures is complex, and no standard procedure to
establish the optimal sample size for this type of analysis has been
developed to date (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). How-
ever, the number of participants in our sample (i.e., the higher level
sample size for the clustered regression analysis) lies well above
the minimum number of 100 suggested by Hox (1995). In addition,
one can approximate the power for our analyses by establishing the
power for parallel parametric analyses. According to Green’s
(1991) formula, 44 participants are required to test a multiple
correlation of a large effect size (as found in the earlier study by
Ehring et al., 2006) with seven predictor variables and a power of
.80 (.05), whereas 103 participants are required to test a
medium effect size.
As sex differences in PTSD prevalence have consistently been
identified in the literature (Tolin & Foa, 2006), we conducted all
analyses separately for male and female participants. The pattern
of results was the same for both sexes, and the article therefore
presents the analyses for the whole sample.
Results
PTSD, Phobia, and Depression
Results of the SCID assessment at 2 weeks showed that 33 of
the 147 participants (22.4%) met criteria for PTSD when Criterion
E (duration for at least 1 month) was not applied. In addition, 3
participants (2%) met criteria for PTSD related to a different event
but did not meet full PTSD criteria in relation to the MVA. These
participants were included in the PTSD group for the present
analyses. Excluding them did not change the results. Thirty par-
ticipants (20.4%) met criteria for travel phobia at 2 weeks, and 14
(9.6%) met criteria for a current major depressive episode. At the
6-month follow-up, 17 of the 141 participants (12.1%) met criteria
for PTSD related to the accident, 25 (17.7%) met criteria for travel
phobia, and 11 (7.8%) met criteria for a current major depressive
episode. As shown in Figure 1, there was substantial comorbidity
between the disorders at both assessments.
Participants showed, on average, moderate symptom levels of
PTSD and travel phobia as well as mild levels of depression (see
Table 3). Mean PDS scores decreased significantly during the
course of the study, F(3, 342)  15.18, p  .001. In contrast, no
significant change over time was found for symptom levels of
travel phobia, F(3, 312)  0.27, p  .85, or depression, F(3,
315)  1.54, p  .21.
Relationship Between Accident Characteristics and
Symptom Severities
Injury severity as assessed with the Injury Severity Score was
not significantly correlated with PTSD or depressive symptom
severity at any assessment (||  .15, ps  .12). However, signif-
icant negative correlations between injury severity and symptom
levels of travel phobia were found at 2 weeks ( .21, p  .05)
and 1 month ( .23, p  .05), and greater injury severity was
related to lower fear and avoidance of travel. This finding might
have been influenced by the fact that most of the participants with
severe injuries had not traveled since the MVA at these assess-
ments (53.1% of all participants at 2 weeks and 37.9% of all
participants at 1 month).
Kruskal–Wallis one-way analyses of variance showed an effect
of type of road usage during the accident (i.e., drivers, motorcy-
clists, bicyclists, or passengers) on symptom levels for most mea-
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2s(3)  8, ps  .05, with the exception of BDI scores at 2
weeks, 
2(3, N  126)  6.20, p  .11, and TPQ scores at 6
months, 
2(3, N  127)  2.80, p  .42. Follow-up Mann–
Whitney tests were conducted for pairwise comparisons. Results
showed that both drivers and passengers showed significantly
higher symptom levels than motorcyclists and bicyclists. No other
differences were significant.
Comparison of Established and Theory-Derived Cognitive
Predictors
Table 3 shows the zero-order correlations between the predictor
variables and PTSD, phobia, and depression severities. The estab-
lished predictors derived from Ozer et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis
showed small to moderate correlations with the psychological
outcomes. An exception was that the number of past traumas was
only significantly correlated with symptom levels of depression at
the 3-month follow-up, not with any other outcome measure. All
theory-derived cognitive variables correlated moderately to highly
with the respective psychological outcome at most assessments.
The results of the nonparametric regression analyses that in-
cluded outcome data from all time points are summarized in Table
4 (detailed results are published online as supplemental material).
The theory-derived regression models were better at predicting
each of the disorders than the set of established predictors from the
meta-analysis, as indicated by lower values of the BIC.
Specificity of Cognitive Models
If cognitive–behavioral models are specific, then each disorder
should be best explained by its disorder-specific model. As shown
in Table 4, the PTSD model yielded a much smaller BIC (i.e., a
better fit) in predicting PTSD symptom severity than the phobia
and depression models. Similarly, the depression model showed
the best model fit in predicting depression, compared to the PTSD
and travel phobia models. However, in contrast to the hypotheses,
the PTSD model showed the best model fit in the prediction of
phobic symptom severities, followed by the phobia model.
Prediction Beyond Initial Symptom Levels
As shown in Table 3, initial symptom levels at 2 weeks
predicted subsequent symptoms levels for all disorders. This
raises the question of whether the other predictors predicted
symptom severity levels at the 6-month follow-up beyond what
could be predicted from initial symptom levels. For each out-
come measure, we therefore compared the BIC for three regres-
sion analyses with the following predictor variables: (a) symp-
tom levels at 2 weeks only, (b) symptom levels at 2 weeks plus
the established predictors from the meta-analysis, and (c) symp-
tom levels at 2 weeks plus the variables from the disorder-
specific cognitive model.
PDS scores at 2 weeks significantly predicted PDS scores at
6 months (incidence rate ratio [IRR]  1.06, p  .001; BIC 
139.43). Adding the variables from the meta-analysis led to
little change in the goodness of fit (BIC  105.14). In contrast,
the model fit parameter improved considerably when the vari-
ables from the PTSD model were included (BIC  1.56). This
compares to a BIC of 73.58 when only the theory-derived
variables were included in the endpoint analysis predicting
PTSD severity at 6 months. Similarly, BDI scores at 2 weeks
significantly predicted BDI scores at 6 months (IRR  1.07,
p  .001; BIC  354.23). Adding the variables from the
meta-analysis improved the model fit to BIC  212.67. The
best prediction was achieved when BDI scores at 2 weeks were
combined with the variables from the cognitive depression
model (BIC  36.60) or when depression at 6 months was
predicted on the basis of theory-derived variables alone (BIC 
37.40). Finally, travel phobia symptoms at 2 weeks signifi-
cantly predicted phobia symptoms at 6 months (IRR  1.04,
p  .001; BIC  399.29). However, adding either the estab-
Figure 1. Distribution of psychological disorders at the 2-week and 6-month follow-ups, as determined by the
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM–IV. PTSD  posttraumatic stress disorder.
225 PTSD, PHOBIA, AND DEPRESSION AFTER MVAlished predictors (BIC  355.09) or the variables from the
travel phobia model (BIC  344.76) contributed little change in
model fit. The BIC for the theory-derived predictors alone was
407.47.
Discussion
This prospective longitudinal study aimed to investigate the
power of disorder-specific cognitive–behavioral models in pre-
dicting PTSD, travel phobias, and depression following injury in
an MVA. In line with previous studies (e.g., Blanchard et al., 2004;
Ehring et al., 2006; Mayou et al., 2001; O’Donnell, Creamer,
Pattison, & Atkin, 2004; Shalev et al., 1998), a substantial minority
of participants developed PTSD, travel phobias, and/or depression.
As expected, the three psychological outcomes were predicted by
(a) initial symptom severities, (b) a set of established predictors of
PTSD identified in a recent meta-analysis (Ozer et al., 2003), and
Table 3
Zero-Order Correlations (Spearman’s Rho) Between Predictor Variables and Symptom Severities
Predictor variable
PTSD severity (PDS) Travel phobia (TPQ) Depression (BDI)
2 weeks 1 month 3 months 6 months 2 weeks 1 month 3 months 6 months 2 weeks 1 month 3 months 6 months
Mean (SD) for symptom
measures
12.91
(11.48)
10.63
(11.32)
9.55
(10.91)
7.91
(9.58)
8.58
(8.14)
8.49
(9.45)
7.91
(9.52)
7.81
(9.81)
13.96
(12.14)
12.35
(11.83)
12.54
(11.49)
13.08
(12.52)
Prediction of psychopathology
from established
predictors
a
No. past traumas .00 .02 .06 .06 .04 .06 .01 .01 .07 .14 .19
* .13
Past emotional problems .24
* .22
* .12 .35
*** .23
* .26
* .14 .27
* .25
* .25
* .22
* .37
***
Perceived life threat .36
*** .31
*** .39
*** .19
* .43
*** .30
*** .31
*** .25
** .25
** .22
** .16 .14
Negative emotions during
MVA .61
*** .43
*** .38
*** .34
*** .55
*** .47
*** .38
*** .35
*** .39
*** .33
*** .28
** .22
*
Dissociation during MVA .55
*** .51
*** .49
*** .44
*** .52
*** .47
*** .38
*** .35
*** .39
*** .33
*** .28
** .22
*
Social support .26
** .32
*** .24
** .30
** .22
* .23
* .16 .23
* .29
** .31
*** .21
* .22
*
Prediction of psychopathology
from PTSD Model
Cognitive processing during
MVA .65
*** .55
*** .54
*** .50
*** .56
*** .51
*** .46
*** .46
*** .40
*** .47
*** .47
*** .41
***
Memory disorganization .27
** .36
*** .39
*** .37
*** .18
* .21
* .26
** .26
** .29
** .31
*** .26
** .27
**
Negative appraisals of
trauma and sequelae .53
*** .60
*** .57
*** .46
*** .49
*** .48
*** .42
*** .51
*** .46
*** .49
*** .37
*** .46
***
Safety behaviors (total) .57
*** .64
*** .50
*** .54
*** .63
*** .71
*** .55
*** .58
*** .46
*** .51
*** .36
*** .45
***
Thought suppression .66
*** .66
*** .66
*** .53
*** .46
*** .57
*** .53
*** .56
*** .37
*** .45
*** .40
*** .44
***
Rumination about trauma
and consequences .59
*** .67
*** .66
*** .62
*** .47
*** .56
*** .50
*** .55
*** .51
*** .67
*** .55
*** .60
***
Ongoing dissociation .65
*** .75
*** .72
*** .55
*** .43
*** .53
*** .58
*** .54
*** .53
*** .72
*** .54
*** .52
***
Prediction of psychopathology
from travel phobia model
Fear during MVA .55
*** .40
*** .37
*** .28
** .54
*** .47
*** .39
*** .34
*** .27
** .24
** .25
** .17
Concerns about future
MVA .39
*** .34
*** .26
** .30
** .46
*** .34
*** .27
*** .18 .28
** .25
** .17 .19
*
Beliefs about other drivers .25
** .21
* .21
* .15 .28
** .29
** .26
** .18
* .18
* .16 .15 .12
Negative beliefs about
travel .37
*** .35
*** .33
*** .32
*** .43
*** .45
*** .31
*** .37
*** .16 .25
** .17 .24
**
Safety behaviors (travel) .57
*** .61
*** .48
*** .53
*** .65
*** .70
*** .55
*** .53
*** .42
*** .47
*** .32
*** .43
***
Prediction of psychopathology
from depression model
Self-devaluation .36
*** .36
*** .35
*** .33
*** .31
*** .27
** .28
** .29
** .48
*** .44
*** .51
*** .46
***
Negative self-evaluation .26
** .33
*** .26
** .25
** .28
** .32
*** .29
** .38
*** .28
** .35
*** .38
*** .41
***
Depressive rumination .45
*** .53
*** .51
*** .44
*** .37
*** .51
*** .45
*** .51
*** .49
*** .68
*** .62
*** .61
***
Ongoing physical problems .33
*** .46
*** .48
*** .38
*** .21
* .25
** .34
*** .41
*** .40
*** .50
*** .41
*** .36
***
Stressful life events .28
** .33
*** .27
** .35
*** .19
* .22
* .18
* .27
** .33
*** .40
*** .36
*** .40
***
Social support .19
* .31
*** .33
*** .36
*** .17 .24 .21
* .17 .25
*** .38
*** .33
*** .35
***
Prediction of psychopathology
from initial symptoms at
2 weeks
PTSD severity (PDS) — .83
*** .71
*** .64
*** —— — ——— — —
Travel phobia (TPQ) — — — — — .85
*** .66
*** .61
*** —— — —
Depression (BDI) — — — — — — — — — .78
*** .63
*** .61
***
Note. Theory-derived correlations are printed in bold. For all 2 weeks data, n  147; 1 month, n  125; 3 months, n  127; 6 months, n  140. PTSD 
posttraumatic stress disorder; PDS  Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale; TPQ  Travel Phobia Questionnaire; BDI  Beck Depression Inventory; MVA 
motor vehicle accident.
a From Ozer et al. (2003).
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behavioral models of the disorders. Nonparametric regression
analyses compared the relative power of the sets of predictors in
predicting each of the disorders. In line with the hypotheses,
symptom levels of PTSD, phobia, and depression were better
predicted by the theory-derived cognitive variables than by the
predictors established in the meta-analysis, as indicated by a better
goodness of fit of the regression models. These results replicate
and extend those of Ehring et al. (2006) with a prospective longi-
tudinal design.
The better performance of the theory-derived variables was not
due to an unusually low predictive power of the variables derived
from the meta-analysis in this population. The correlations re-
ported in Table 3 all match well the confidence intervals reported
by Ozer et al. (2003); for example, the rhos of .26 to .32 found
for social support for the different time points match their results
of a confidence interval of .15 to .40 and weighted average of
r  .29. The only exception was the correlation of the number of
past traumas, which fell below Ozer et al.’s confidence interval of
.11 to .22. It is unclear whether differences in samples or differ-
ences in the assessment of past traumas, such as the types of
previous traumas under consideration, may account for the latter
finding. Alternatively, the fact that PTSD was prospectively de-
termined soon after trauma in the present study, whereas the
meta-analysis mainly relied on cross-sectional studies, including
those with trauma recencies of 18 to more than 40 years, may, in
part, explain the discrepancy. It is interesting that Ozer et al.
(2003) identified three studies of accident survivors with recencies
of 4 months and less that all showed correlations of trauma history
and PTSD between .00 and .03, as in the present study. Thus, our
results replicate the results of the meta-analysis well, supporting
the validity of the findings.
Initial symptom levels after trauma have repeatedly been shown
to predict subsequent severity of symptoms (e.g., Rothbaum, Foa,
Riggs, Murdock, & Walsh, 1992; Shalev et al., 1998) and are easy
to measure. This raises the question of whether the predictors
studied in this article provide added value in predicting the long-
term psychological outcomes of trauma. The results of the regres-
sion analyses indicate that the predictors identified in Ozer et al.’s
(2003) meta-analysis did not predict long-term outcome when
initial symptom levels were controlled. A possible explanation for
this negative finding is that these variables mainly predict the onset
of symptoms but do not add to the prediction of long-term out-
come, as maintaining factors are not included (Ehlers & Steil,
1995). In contrast, the variables derived from a cognitive model of
PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) explained PTSD symptoms at 6
months above symptom levels at 2 weeks. These results are in line
with those of previous prospective studies (Dunmore et al., 2001;
Ehlers et al., 1998; Halligan et al., 2003). They extend the previous
results in that predictors in the present study were assessed very
soon after the trauma. It thus appears that the cognitive variables
as specified in this model were already predictive from 2 weeks
after the trauma onward. Similarly, variables derived from the
vulnerability–stress model of depression (Ingram et al., 1998)
improved the goodness of fit of the prediction of depression scores
at 6 months above what could be predicted from initial depression
at 2 weeks. Taken together, the results support the role of cognitive
factors in the maintenance of PTSD and depression following
MVA.
These results are also important for the question of possible
criterion contamination between the cognitive predictor and out-
come variables. It is important to note that there was no overlap
between any of the predictors and the dependent variables in this
study. However, critics may argue that it is still possible that some
of the theory-derived variables in this study were affected by
symptom levels (e.g., depressive rumination, thought suppression).
Our finding that the theory-derived variables predicted outcome at
follow-up when initial symptom levels were statistically controlled
shows that their predictive power cannot be explained by criterion
contamination.
Cognitive models of psychopathology postulate content speci-
ficity—that is, specific sets of cognitions are thought to be in-
volved in the development and maintenance of each disorder (e.g.,
Beck et al., 1979; Clark, 1999). The specificity hypothesis implies
that each of the three psychological outcomes should be best
predicted by its disorder-specific model. The results support spec-
ificity for PTSD and depression. However, for travel phobia, the
PTSD model showed a better fit than the phobia model. The results
are consistent with those of a cross-sectional study by Ehring et al.
(2006) and with Mayou et al.’s (2001) finding that some variables
predicted PTSD as well as phobias after MVA but not depression.
Thus, whereas the results clearly support the role of cognitive
factors in the prediction of PTSD and depression, they are less
clear for the prediction of travel phobia. The variables derived
from the cognitive–behavioral phobia model failed to substantially
predict symptom levels at follow-up above initial symptom levels
Table 4
Goodness-of-Fit Indexes (Bayesian Information Criteria) From Regression Analyses
Predictor
PTSD severity
(PDS)
Phobia severity
(TPQ)
Depression severity
(BDI)
Established predictors
a 415.28 669.70 262.32
Cognitive-behavioral predictors
PTSD model 631.10 289.62 354.83
Phobia model 258.64 191.61 446.63
Depression model 148.13 82.09 691.15
Note. Lower numbers indicate better fit. Goodness-of-fit indices for the disorder-specific sets of theory-derived
variables are printed in bold. PTSD  posttraumatic stress disorder; PDS  Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale;
TPQ  Travel Phobia Questionnaire; BDI  Beck Depression Inventory.
a From Ozer et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis.
227 PTSD, PHOBIA, AND DEPRESSION AFTER MVAand performed worse at predicting outcome than the PTSD model.
The results are in contrast to the findings of the cross-sectional
study by Ehring et al. (2006), in which cognitive–behavioral
variables were found to be specific when symptom levels of travel
phobia were predicted. Thus, the variables derived from the phobia
model appear to specifically fail when predicting chronic levels of
travel phobia from early assessments. One possible explanation is
that restrictions in travel due to injuries may have interfered with
the early assessment of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors in travel
situations. Approximately 50% of participants were still unable to
travel when the predictors were assessed at 2 weeks or had only
been in travel situations that were less relevant to their fear (e.g.,
being a passenger in a car for motorcyclists). This might have
compromised the accuracy of their ratings. Furthermore, condi-
tioned emotional reactions may be difficult to assess with self-
report measures. Conversely, the findings could also reflect limi-
tations of the theoretical model. The pattern of results is consistent
with the idea that travel-related cognitions and safety behaviors are
a consequence or an epiphenomenon of phobic travel anxiety
rather than a causal or maintaining factor (O ¨hman & Mineka,
2001). This would explain the high concurrent associations be-
tween these variables and symptom measures but comparably poor
predictive power. Finally, travel phobia might have had different
sources in different participants and might have been a symptom of
PTSD or subthreshold PTSD (Blanchard et al., 1996) in a sub-
group of participants. Such lack of homogeneity might have in-
creased error variance and would explain the high power of the
PTSD model in predicting phobic symptom levels. More research
is needed before a decision between these alternative explanations
can be made.
A number of limitations of the study are noteworthy. First, the
assessment of predictors relied on participants’ self-report, which
is susceptible to a range of biases. It would be desirable to conduct
additional studies with objective tasks and/or experimental designs
to further test the role of the cognitive factors in maintaining PTSD
and depression after trauma. A number of such studies have
yielded mostly supportive results for the PTSD model investigated
in this article (e.g., Ehring, Frank, & Ehlers, in press; Halligan et
al., 2002, 2003; Michael, Ehlers, & Halligan, 2005), but corre-
sponding data on the maintenance of depression after trauma are
lacking. Second, only six of the seven variables from Ozer et al.’s
(2003) meta-analysis were included in the present study. However,
it appears unlikely that this omission reduced the predictive power
of the set of established predictors, as family psychopathology had
the lowest effect sizes in the meta-analysis and has generally not
been found to predict PTSD following MVA (Blanchard & Hick-
ling, 2004).
Third, like other studies, this study found substantial comorbid-
ity and high correlations between the symptom measures of PTSD,
phobia, and depression. This raises the question of whether the
outcome variables studied indeed represented different constructs.
As we used self-report measures that have been validated against
structured clinical interviews (Beck et al., 1979; Ehring et al.,
2006; Foa et al., 1997), we assume that the different scales indeed
measured different constructs and that the high correlations were
due to high comorbidity in the sample. In addition, the high
intercorrelations of the outcome measures worked against the
study hypothesis in that they decreased the chances to establish
specificity of the predictions. The fact that we found evidence for
specificity despite high comorbidity is in line with the hypothesis
that PTSD and depression, and possibly also travel phobia, are
distinct responses to MVAs and not a unitary phenomenon, as
suggested by some authors (for a more detailed discussion of this
controversy, see Blanchard, Buckley, Hickling, & Taylor, 1998;
Breslau, Chase, & Anthony, 2002; O’Donnell, Creamer, & Patti-
son, 2004). However, given the high comorbidity between the
disorders as well as the symptom overlap, it might be useful for
future research to adopt a dimensional, rather than categorical,
approach to studying differential outcomes of MVA by investigat-
ing symptom clusters across disorders rather than symptom dimen-
sions based on different diagnostic entities. Such an approach
could also sharpen theoretical ideas about the mechanisms under-
lying the disorders.
Fourth, the distribution of the data required nonparametric re-
gression analyses. These allowed us neither to compute signifi-
cance tests for differences in prediction accuracy by the different
models nor to report effect sizes for the multivariate analyses.
However, the size of the zero-order correlations was similar to
those in the Ehring et al. (2006) cross-sectional study, so their data
can serve as a rough estimate of multivariate effect sizes. In Ehring
et al.’s (2006) study, predictors from Ozer et al.’s (2003) meta-
analyses predicted between 40% and 46% of the variance of
symptom severities, whereas the variables derived from the cog-
nitive models accounted for a significantly higher proportion of the
variance (between 66% and 76%). The PTSD model explained
13%–15% more variance of PTSD severity than the other models,
and the depression model explained 7% more variance of depres-
sion severity than the PTSD model and 34% more variance than
the phobia model.
Fifth, the number of participants in each disorder category was
relatively small, so that we could compare neither subgroups of
participants with different single disorders nor participants with
one disorder only versus those with several comorbid disorders. In
addition, the sample was self-selected. However, results from a
comparison with a random sample of MVA admissions at the same
hospital suggest that the sample was largely representative of the
population studied. Replication of the results with larger and,
ideally, consecutive samples is desirable. Finally, the study only
included one type of trauma, MVA with relatively low injury
severity, and participants were assessed shortly after trauma. Fu-
ture research needs to determine whether the results generalize to
other types of trauma. It is encouraging to note that a recent study
of assault survivors found similar results (Kleim, 2006). Never-
theless, given the broad evidence for the established predictors
from Ozer et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis, other replications of the
superior predictive power of the theory-derived cognitive variables
are necessary before firm conclusions can be drawn (see also
Kleim, Ehlers, & Glucksman, 2007). It would also be of interest to
test whether the cognitive models apply equally well to trauma
survivors who present many years after the event. As these models
emphasize maintaining factors, we expect that the results should
generalize well to very chronic populations.
The results have a number of clinical implications: First, as
MVAs are common but only few survivors develop chronic emo-
tional problems, the early identification of vulnerable individuals
in need of treatment is an important clinical problem. The results
suggest that theory-derived cognitive variables, but not the estab-
lished predictors from Ozer et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis, im-
228 EHRING, EHLERS, AND GLUCKSMANproved the prediction of chronic PTSD and depression above
initial symptom levels. As the cognitive predictors were assessed
soon after the trauma, they can be regarded as promising candi-
dates for the early identification of people at risk for chronic
emotional problems. Second, the results support cognitive concep-
tualizations of PTSD and depression following MVA, and they
suggest that individual differences in maintaining factors are im-
portant in predicting chronic PTSD and depression after trauma
and thus also provide promising targets for psychological treat-
ment.
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